Since at least 2012, the Bank failed to establish and maintain a compliance program that adequately covers the required BSA/AML elements. The Bank did not develop adequate systems to monitor, investigate and report suspicious customer activity, particularly cross-border and high-volume cash activity. The Bank failed to develop adequate customer due diligence (“CDD”) and enhanced due diligence (“EDD”) processes, and failed to adequately investigate questionable activity related to law enforcement subpoenas and requests received pursuant to section 314(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). In addition, the Bank’s audit scope was limited in key areas, staffing in the Bank’s BSA compliance department was insufficient, and Bank staff did not receive sufficient BSA training to perform their respective duties. The Bank’s failure to establish and maintain an adequate BSA/AML compliance program resulted in violations of 12 U.S.C. § 1818(s) and its implementing regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 21.21.
(2) The 2013 Consent Order required, among other things, that the Bank engage an independent consultant to perform a review of transaction and account activity between January 2010 and December 2013 (“Look-Back”). The Look-Back resulted in the filing of 472 Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”), reporting over $233 million in previously unreported suspicious activity. The Bank’s systemic failure to report suspicious transactions and file SARs
resulted in a violation of 12 C.F.R. § 21.11.
(3) Further, during the OCC’s BSA/AML examination of the Bank that commenced in November 2012, the Bank concealed from the OCC documents requested by OCC officials 3
and examiners that were relevant to the OCC’s evaluation of the Bank’s BSA/AML compliance program, resulting in a violation of 12 U.S.C. § 481. Former senior officers of the Bank participated in efforts to preclude the OCC from obtaining the requested information